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
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The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (S)

An Intelligence Assessment



Secret

IA 84-10042C

June 1984

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The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (S)

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**The Soviet Air and Naval
Presence at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam (S)**

Summary

*Information available as of
1 April 1984 was used to
prepare this report.*

The Soviets have been increasing their air and naval presence and expanding facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, since 1979. In late 1983 they deployed naval Badger medium bombers, including strike models, to Cam Ranh; and they appear to be making preparations at the airfield to support long-term deployment of Badgers. The number of Soviet naval ships routinely present at Cam Ranh port has increased steadily during the last few years.

Soviet naval aircraft and ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay demonstrate visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese government and provide the Soviets the capability to:

- Monitor and interfere with international shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- Strike US air and naval bases in the Philippines.
- Threaten the southern coastal areas of China.
- Conduct surveillance of all of the South China Sea.

The nine Badgers deployed at the airfield since late 1983 form a composite squadron of five strike-capable, two tanker, one photoreconnaissance, and one ECM aircraft—a combination that is similar to the composition of Badger regiments in the USSR. The Soviets began preparation in late February 1984 for their first flight operations from this airfield with antiship air-to-surface missiles. Both AS-2 and AS-5 missiles and support equipment are present at the airfield. There is no evidence of nuclear warhead storage.

Increases in equipment and expansion of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield suggest that up to a regiment of naval Badgers—30 to 35 aircraft—could eventually be deployed there, perhaps during 1984. Major construction at the airfield includes:

- An air-to-surface missile storage and handling facility for the AS-2 and AS-5.
- Air munitions storage buildings.

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- Two POL facilities with a capacity of about 6 million liters of fuel.
- New communications facilities, barracks, and support facilities.

The Soviet ship contingent routinely seen at Cam Ranh represents the largest concentration of Soviet combatants and auxiliaries—usually 12 or more ships—deployed to a naval facility outside of the Soviet Union. Support for these ships is provided mostly by depot and replenishment ships. In contrast to expanded aircraft support facilities at the airfield, there has been little expansion of ship support facilities ashore. The Soviets may have refrained from constructing substantial and costly shore facilities to support their ship deployments because they fear that access to those facilities could be denied at a future date, as occurred in Egypt and Somalia. The lack of shore facilities may also reflect Vietnamese sensitivity to a large, foreign-controlled military base on its soil.

We have no evidence of a formal basing agreement providing for Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities in the Cam Ranh Bay area. Soviet access, development, and use of these facilities seems assured as long as Vietnam requires a major counterweight to the threat from China.

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The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (S)

Introduction

The Soviets deployed naval Badger medium bomber aircraft, including strike-capable models, to Cam Ranh, Vietnam, in November 1983. This development significantly increases Soviet military capabilities in Southeast Asia. As important as it is, however, it is just one more development in the growth of the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh. (S [redacted])

This paper addresses the buildup of Soviet naval air and seagoing forces at Cam Ranh since 1979. It discusses the development of facilities that support those forces, the capabilities of the forces, and the potential threat they present to opposing military forces in the area. (S [redacted])

Soviet Naval Air Force Presence

Soviet air activities are centered primarily at facilities located in the northern portion of Cam Ranh Bay Airfield (figure 1). The Soviets are apparently the sole occupants of this area, which is served by the largest aircraft parking apron at the airfield. The parking apron separates the majority of their facilities from the nearest Vietnamese-controlled area. The Soviet facilities are secured by fence, and access to individual areas within the compound also appears to be controlled. The Soviets are using the badly damaged US-built POL facility at the southern end of the airfield for their aviation fuel storage site, and they have begun construction on a second POL facility (figure 2). They also recently began upgrading and securing the abandoned US-built ammunition storage area east of the airfield. (S [redacted])

The Vietnamese use two areas at this airfield. A helicopter training regiment is located on the west side of the airfield, and a surface-to-air (SAM) missile support facility is located on the east side. Both areas are wall-secured. The Vietnamese also

man six SAM sites, three SA-2 and three SA-3, that protect the approaches to the airfield. Most of the other airfield facilities built by the US remain heavily damaged and unused. (S [redacted])

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Support Facilities

Soviet construction and renovation of air-related support facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield began in mid-1982. Prior to then the Soviets had only a communications facility, several small support buildings, and a few ground service vehicles at the airfield—an amount sufficient to support only the Bear D and Bear F aircraft that periodically operate out of the airfield. (S [redacted])

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Air-to-Surface Missile Storage. In mid-1982 construction began on several quonset buildings in an area next to the parking apron that serves as an air-to-surface missile storage and support facility. By mid-1983 six quonset buildings were completed and two additional buildings were under construction. This separately fenced facility will provide over 3,000 square meters of floorspace when completed. It will be large enough to provide missile storage and checkout for a greater number of strike aircraft than the five Badger strike aircraft presently deployed at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield. It will be comparable to ASM storage and support facilities supporting Badger regiments (30 to 35 aircraft) in the USSR. (S [redacted])

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Munitions Storage. Construction of what probably will be air munitions storage buildings began in June 1983 in the old US-built ammunition storage area east of the airfield (figure 3). The design of these buildings is typically Soviet and similar to buildings at air munitions storage facilities in the USSR. As of December 1983 three buildings, each 30 meters long and 18 meters wide, were under construction. Each building is located in one of the old US-built bunkered revetments. Although construction is proceeding slowly, they could be completed in 1984. Nine additional old bunkered revetments are available in this area for munitions storage expansion. There is no construction of, or provision for, nuclear weapons storage at this facility or at the air-to-surface missile storage facility. (S [redacted])

Communications. Prior to mid-1983 communications facilities at the airfield consisted of antennas on and near a 3,600-square-meter communications and support building, a FIX-24 direction finding (HF/DF) facility, and a Park Drive mobile satellite communications (satcom) unit. During the summer of 1983 communications were upgraded by adding a second Park Drive mobile satcom unit. The satcom units directly link the Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield with Moscow. The communications and support building probably also serves as the administration center for the Soviets at the airfield. (S [redacted])

Ground Support Vehicles. Before August 1983 the Soviets had only five TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks and about 12 miscellaneous vehicles supporting Bear D, Bear F, and occasional transient aircraft operations. The motor pool area was expanded during the first half of 1983 to accommodate an influx of ground service vehicles. By September 1983 the number of vehicles had reached roughly 100, including the equivalent of a medium bomber regiment's air technical battalion, in addition to numerous general purpose vehicles.¹ The number of TZ-

22 aircraft fuel trucks also increased from five to 15—about the same number normally used to support a Soviet medium bomber regiment. (S [redacted])

Barracks and Storage Area. During the summer of 1982 the Soviets began construction of 17 one-story buildings in a separately secured area. Ten of the buildings, located at the south end of the secured area, are identical in design and appear to be barracks. By March 1984 eight were completed, one was being roofed, and the foundation was being laid for the tenth. All of these buildings are or will be partitioned into two-man, or possibly three-man, rooms with a total floorspace of over 8,600 square meters. The interior arrangement of these buildings suggests they will provide living space for 400 to 600 senior technicians and officers. (S [redacted])

The other seven buildings, located at the north end of the secured area, have no internal partitioning. All are complete, and we believe they are probably for storage. Some, however, could be open-bay barracks intended for enlisted personnel. The total floorspace of these seven buildings is 4,000 square meters; if all were used as barracks they could house about 1,000 men. (S [redacted])

Miscellaneous Support Facilities. Several smaller facilities at the airfield also are occupied by the Soviets. An AKDS-70 mobile air separation unit near the motor pool supplies oxygen used on board aircraft. A probable electric generator facility is at the south end of the Soviet area, and a supply building and a support building are near the center of the Soviet area. An aircraft operations building has been completed next to the parking apron. (S [redacted])

¹Air technical battalions provide fuel, armament, and oxygen for aircraft as well as base security; supply; communications and administrative services; and air traffic control, transportation, and airfield maintenance. (S)

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POL Storage. About March 1980 the Soviets began constructing a new POL storage facility at the site of the destroyed US-built POL facility just south of the airfield (figure 4). As of December 1983 some 200 POL tanks, most of which are below ground, had been emplaced for a total storage capacity of almost 5 million liters of fuel. In addition, vehicle tracks around a large, US-built vertical POL tank suggest that repair work is under way on the tank. The earthen cofferdam surrounding the spill pond for this tank has been breached, apparently to provide access for repair vehicles. If the Soviets repair this tank, the capacity of the POL facility would be increased by about 3 million liters.

(S [REDACTED])

In March 1984 the Soviets began constructing a second POL facility next to the parking apron. Twenty POL tanks with a total capacity of about 1 million liters have been delivered to the site.

(S [REDACTED])

The Soviets have made no provisions for hydrant fueling of their aircraft. TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks normally are loaded at the main POL facility and serve aircraft parked on the large apron 2.5 kilometers away. The new POL facility under construction will provide improved fueling services for quick-response missions that otherwise might be delayed due to the time required to transport fuel from the main POL facility. (S [REDACTED])

There is no evidence of an operational pipeline connecting either POL facility with the port facilities 11 kilometers south of the airfield. Sections of a US-built pipeline are missing and no repair activity has been evident. Apparently POL facilities at the airfield are replenished by fuel trucks. The fuel probably is delivered to the port by a Soviet merchant tanker or naval oiler routinely seen moored at the piers or anchored offshore. Although these ships primarily support naval operations, they could also carry aviation fuel. (S [REDACTED])

The capacity of the POL facilities at the airfield is consistent with that normally found at airfields in the USSR supporting medium-range bomber regiments, and it is more than adequate to support the missions currently flown by both the Badger and

Bear aircraft assigned there. Based on a maximum loading of about 42,000 liters of fuel for a Badger and a radius mission flown to near fuel exhaustion, a single sortie from Cam Ranh by the nine Badgers assigned there would consume about 5 percent of the airfield's POL supply. A single sortie by a regiment of Badgers (20 strike and 10 supporting aircraft) staging from Cam Ranh with the same mission profile would consume about 20 percent of the airfield's POL supply. (S [REDACTED])

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Fuel supplies could limit extended air operations from Cam Ranh by the Soviets. In the USSR airfields are supported by an extensive logistics infrastructure. In Vietnam the Soviets probably must rely on sea-delivered fuel supplies and, to a lesser extent, air deliveries. We have no evidence of an agreement with the Vietnamese to provide Soviet forces at Cam Ranh with aviation fuel. Soviet reliance on such an agreement would be counter to past practices they have followed in establishing their overseas bases. (S [REDACTED])

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Aircraft Deployments

The Soviet Union has routinely deployed pairs of Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Bear F antisubmarine warfare aircraft to Cam Ranh Bay Airfield since 1980. In 1983 the Soviets deployed naval Badger aircraft, including strike-capable models, to the airfield. With the exception of military exercises, this is the first out-of-area deployment of Badgers in more than a decade. The last such deployment took place from 1968 to mid-1972, when a naval air unit of as many as 36 aircraft—two-thirds of which were Badgers—operated from three airfields in Egypt. (S [REDACTED])

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According to special intelligence, the first deployment of naval Badgers to Cam Ranh Bay Airfield [REDACTED] Japanese Air Self Defense Forces (JASDF) aircraft, which observed the Badgers on their way to Vietnam, and imagery of Cam Ranh Bay Airfield [REDACTED]

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indicated that this deployment consisted of four aircraft—two Badger A tankers, one Badger E photoreconnaissance aircraft, and one Badger J ECM aircraft [REDACTED] special intelligence detected a second deployment of three Badger

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aircraft flying to Vietnam, [redacted] two more Badger aircraft arrived, bringing the total number of Badgers at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield to nine (figure 5). [redacted] revealed that these five Badgers are strike-capable, modified Badger Cs.² This combination of strike-capable and strike-support aircraft is consistent with a composite squadron of medium bombers found in a typical Soviet naval Badger strike regiment. (S [redacted])

²Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) has three Badger models equipped for strike operations—Badger Cs, modified Badger Cs, and Badger Gs. Badger Cs are deployed only with naval aviation. They entered service about 1960, primarily for use in maritime strike missions. This aircraft carries a single AS-2 antiship, air-to-surface missile (ASM) on its centerline. Modified Badger Cs carry either two AS-5 or two AS-6 antiship ASMs mounted on pylons under their wings, or an AS-2 on its centerline. Badger Gs also carry two AS-5s or two AS-6s mounted on pylons under the wings. (S)

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Capability for Air-to-Surface Missile Operations.

The airfield facility improvements and the presence of AS-2 and AS-5 missiles and missile-support equipment indicate that Soviet planning for Badger deployments to Vietnam included the capability for strike aircraft to conduct air-to-surface missile operations. (S [REDACTED])

The Soviets made a concerted effort to keep missiles and missile-support equipment in covered storage until they were ready for use. In addition, two of the five modified Badger Cs at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield were photographed while enroute to Vietnam by US Navy aircraft operating from the carrier USS *Midway*. These Badgers were not fitted with missile pylons under their wings, but discoloration on the aircraft indicated that pylons previously had been attached. It is possible that all five modified Badger Cs were flown to Cam Ranh Bay

Airfield without attached pylons in order to obscure their intended role. (S [REDACTED])

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Missile pylon installation and the first loading of air-to-surface missiles on the modified Badger C aircraft took place during February and March 1984 (figure 7). Soviet ground support personnel moved missile pylon crates onto the parking apron in early February 1984 in preparation for their installation on the five strike aircraft. Pylon installation was completed by early March 1984. A missile handling dolly for the AS-5 also was positioned near the aircraft when the pylons were being installed, suggesting practice ASM loadings for ground crew training may have occurred (figure 8). (S [redacted])

Loading of air-to-surface missiles on the modified Badger C aircraft was observed [redacted]

and apparently involved both AS-5 and AS-2 missiles. Although the only missiles seen at the time were AS-2s, missile handling dollies for both the AS-2 and the AS-5 were on the apron. An AS-5 missile was seen in front of one of the missile storage quonset buildings two days earlier (figure 9). (S [redacted])

The quonset buildings in the missile storage area can easily accommodate the 10 to 15 ASMs that can be carried on the five modified Badger Cs. When the two additional buildings are completed, the facility will be capable of meeting the missile storage and handling requirement of a Badger regiment—probably as many as 60 air-to-surface missiles. (S [redacted])

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Prospect for Additional Deployments. According to special intelligence acquired since December 1983, the Badger aircraft based at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield have been flown for pilot familiarization within the local airfield area and for navigation, reconnaissance, and probably airborne refueling training. This training pattern is typical of Soviet aircraft units newly established within and outside of the USSR, and it probably will expand to include strike training later this summer. When the existing squadron reaches operational readiness, the Soviets may deploy additional Badgers to Cam Ranh Bay Airfield, probably during 1984. (S [redacted])

The nature and size of Soviet facilities now in place or under construction at the airfield strongly suggest that the Soviets are developing the capability to support extended deployments of Badger aircraft

in regimental strength. The apron where the Soviet aircraft are parked is large enough to accommodate a regiment of Badgers and the four Bear aircraft that routinely deploy there, as well as other transient aircraft. Except for the absence of revetments to protect parked aircraft and provisions for nuclear weapons storage, the facilities are comparable to those supporting medium-range bomber regiments in the USSR. The only apparent constraint at this time is missile storage and handling facilities for additional strike aircraft; however, such facilities are under construction and could be ready to support a regiment-sized force as early as the fall of 1984. The typical naval Badger strike regiment consists of 30-35 aircraft, at least twenty of which are ASM-capable. The remaining aircraft models are tankers, ECM support aircraft, and training aircraft. (S [redacted])

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Naval Air Capabilities and Force Options

The composite Badger squadron and the Bear aircraft at Cam Ranh provide the Soviets the capability to monitor and interfere with international shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (figure 10). The aircraft can conduct surveillance of all of the South China Sea, as well as strike US air and naval bases in the Philippines. Soviet use of the airfield at Cam Ranh also poses a threat to the southern coastal areas of China, thereby demonstrating visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese government. (S [redacted])

Soviet Naval Presence

Soviet Navy ships were first seen at Cam Ranh Bay in early 1979. The Soviet naval ship contingent at Cam Ranh Bay has increased steadily since then and, by March 1984, averaged about 12 ships—the largest concentration of Soviet auxiliaries and combatants routinely deployed at any non-Soviet base. This concentration of ships is larger than the number maintained by the Soviets in Alexandria during the early 1970s, when the Soviet Navy had ready access to that Egyptian port, and is larger than present ship concentrations at other facilities used by the Soviets. At Dehalak Island, Ethiopia—the major Soviet base supporting operations in the Indian Ocean—the Soviet Navy maintains a depot ship, a floating dock, a stores barge, and a few miscellaneous small craft. Two or three transient combatants usually are seen there. In Tartus, Syria—the major port used in the Mediterranean—only a depot ship, a stores barge, a few miscellaneous small craft, and one submarine are seen in port. (S [redacted])

Support Facilities

Depot and Support Ships. The Soviet Navy generally relies on a group of depot and support ships to provide replenishment and minor maintenance and upkeep for its ships at overseas bases. In 1980 the Soviet Navy stationed an Amur-class depot ship at Cam Ranh Bay, establishing an identifiable naval presence there. Since then the number of supporting ships and craft has grown and now includes naval oilers, naval-subordinated merchant tankers, a deperming ship, ocean-going tugs, a covered

Figure 10
Potential Surveillance and Target Areas of Badger Aircraft Staging From Cam Ranh, Vietnam



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stores barge, yard oilers and fuel barges, oil spill cleanup craft, possible picket boats, and small tugs or line-handling ships. Recently, a submarine tender routinely has been seen at the port and may now be assigned to the support forces there. Merchant ships, which are occasionally seen in port, may be delivering supplies and stores for use by Soviet forces. (S [redacted])

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In late 1980 an old Soviet ship repair dock was delivered to the port. This dock normally is stationed in the outer bay and may have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. It is capable of providing minor repairs to conventionally powered submarines and surface combatants up to the size of light frigates. In the future a larger, more capable dock, such as one of the two 8,500-ton capacity docks delivered to Ho Chi Minh City, may also be sent to Cam Ranh. This would permit the repair of ships up to the size of light cruisers of the Kara-class. (S [redacted])

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The Soviet hospital ship *Ob* makes periodic deployments to Cam Ranh Bay. This ship probably provides medical services to Soviets stationed in Cam Ranh Bay and possibly to Soviets located elsewhere in the country. (S [redacted])

Berthing Facilities. When Soviet ships were first seen at Cam Ranh in 1979, berthing facilities consisted of two former US-built piers. The Soviets have refurbished both of these piers and have installed three floating piers. Four of the five piers are used exclusively by Soviet ships (figure 11). The fifth and northernmost pier is used only by the Vietnamese Navy. Work progressed slowly during 1983 and early 1984 on an earth-and-rubble approach for a sixth pier at the southern end of the port. When the pier approach is completed, the pier will be assembled from three pier sections now at the port. (S [redacted])

The five existing piers appear to be equipped to provide water and electricity to ships moored to them. A 4-kilometer-long pipeline from a reservoir provides fresh water to the port area. Electricity probably is provided by a generator located in a building on a quay between the two northernmost piers. Security checkpoints were built at the approaches to the four Soviet piers in 1983. A checkpoint also was built at the incomplete pier approach, indicating impending use by the Soviets. No checkpoint, however, has been built at the approach to the Vietnamese pier. (S [redacted])

Ashore Support Facilities. The Soviets so far have not constructed extensive shore facilities to support their ships at Cam Ranh Bay. The reason for this lack of construction may be that the Navy does not want to construct substantial and costly facilities with the risk of losing access to them at a future date—as occurred in Egypt and Somalia. Also, the Navy may feel that it does not need substantial shore facilities to support its ships, since it can replenish and maintain them from depot and support ships. Only a few facilities for training and crew rest and recreation have been built, including an athletic and recreation area consisting of a soccer field, basketball and tennis courts, and four

outdoor chessboards. An infantry-style obstacle course also has been constructed. Building construction has been limited to a few shed-type structures in the area of the piers. (S [redacted])

In addition to these facilities, the Soviets are using a former South Vietnamese Navy compound located adjacent to the Soviet pier area. Although we cannot determine the extent of its use, we assume the Soviets are occupying the administration, housing, and general support facilities. The buildings in this compound have 7,000 square meters of floor-space and could provide housing for several hundred persons. Additional warehouse-type facilities are in the vicinity of the port area, but we have no evidence that they are being used by the Soviets. (S [redacted])

Additional Security. In addition to the security checkpoints at the approaches to the piers used by the Soviet ships, four BTR-60 armored personnel carriers (APCs) routinely have been seen in the port area. These vehicles may be used by a Soviet naval security group assigned to Cam Ranh Bay. It probably is quartered aboard the Amur-class depot ship. The vehicles routinely are parked in the port area near the berth used by the Amur; not at the former South Vietnamese naval compound. A similar naval security force is believed to be assigned to the Soviet base on Dehalak Island, Ethiopia. (S [redacted])

Naval Combatant Deployments

A variety of combatants has been seen at Cam Ranh Bay since 1979. Surface combatants have ranged in size from minesweepers and Petya-II-class light frigates to Kara-class guided cruisers. The aircraft carrier *Minsk*, the largest surface warship in the Soviet Pacific Fleet, also has anchored in Cam Ranh Bay during its deployments in the South China Sea. Amphibious ships such as Rogov-class amphibious assault transport docks, Ropucha-class tank landing ships, and Polnocny-class medium landing ships have been identified in port and may occasionally transport supplies from the Soviet Union. Submarines calling at Cam Ranh Bay include F-class conventionally powered attack submarines and N- and V-class nuclear-powered attack

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submarines. E-II- and C-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles routinely use the port. One W-class conventionally powered submarine also has been based at Cam Ranh. This submarine may be used as a training target for joint antisubmarine exercises with the Vietnamese Navy or as a battery-charging station for other conventionally powered submarines using the port. (S [redacted])

Naval Ship Capabilities and Force Options

Access to Cam Ranh Bay port facilities provides major benefits for the Soviet Navy. By using the port as a logistics support base, the deployment times for ships operating in the South China Sea can be significantly extended. The Soviet Navy can reprovision, refuel, and provide minor upkeep and maintenance to its ships, eliminating the need for them to return to distant bases in the Soviet Pacific area or to rely on open ocean anchorages. In addition, Cam Ranh Bay is used as an interim stop to replenish Soviet naval ships transiting between the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Pacific Fleet area. The majority of Soviet naval ships operating in the Indian Ocean are home-based in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. (S [redacted])

Soviet ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay can monitor and, in times of conflict, interfere with international shipping between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Transit lanes between the US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and the Indian Ocean also could be threatened. In addition, Soviet ships based at Cam Ranh can conduct patrols off the Vietnamese coast, demonstrating support for the Vietnamese government, as well as presenting a threat to southern China. (S [redacted])

Vietnam's View of the Soviet Presence

We have no evidence that the Soviets and Vietnamese have concluded a formal basing agreement for Soviet use of Cam Ranh or other Vietnamese facilities. Hanoi has consistently denied that any such agreement exists but has held open the possibility in the event of an extreme threat to Vietnam's national security. Recognizing that their present close congruence of interests may not last indefinitely, Moscow seems likely to continue following a conservative approach—as it has in other countries—toward investing in long-term, large-scale improvements at Vietnamese facilities. The absence of a massive building program also reflects Vietnamese sensitivities toward any unconstrained growth in foreign influence in Vietnam. (S)

Soviet-Vietnamese relations, though not especially warm, are solid enough to allow for a continuing gradual increase in Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities. As long as Vietnam requires a major counterweight to Chinese pressure, Soviet entree to Vietnamese facilities seems assured. (S)

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Appendix

Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft Based at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam

Aircraft	Primary Mission	Payload (km)	Range (km) ^a	Radius (km) ^a	Refueled Radius (km) ^a
Bear D	Maritime Reconnaissance and Targeting	Guns	17,000	7,400-8,500	9,400-10,600
Bear F	Antisubmarine Warfare	Guns, torpedoes, depth bombs, sonobuoys, marine markers	15,600	6,100-8,000	8,300-10,200
Badger A	Tanker ^b	Guns, fuel	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100
Modified Badger C	Antiship Strike	Guns, bombs, one AS-2 centerline or two AS-5 wings or two AS-6 wings	2,000-3,700	1,350-2,200	2,700- 3,300
Badger E	Photoreconnaissance	Guns, cameras	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100
Badger J	ECM/Strike Support	Guns, click jammer, other active ECM systems	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100

^aRange, radius, and refueled radius figures vary based on payload and mission profile and have been rounded.

^bMany Badger As are configured as freefall bombers. Range and radius figures are based on the bomber variant.

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